As is tradition, the season ended in April for the New York Knicks. The subsequent period of time, a vaguely familiar event known as the Playoffs. It’s essence serves more as a source of torturous fantasy than earnest entertainment. A time of fanatical scenario creation to bring the Knicks to the promised land. Usually based upon potential player acquisition, the principal focus this offseason would be the “vacant” head coaching position.
The ever prognostic New York media would have us believe the position was not truely available, and that a faux search was being conducted before Jackson would ultimately settle on his faithful disciple, Kurt Rambis. They chastised Jackson for being on vacation, ignoring his managerial duties by neglecting the draft combine and several high-profile coaching candidates. Chief among them, consensus best available, Tom Thibodeau. A defensive mastermind, and disciple of beloved former Knicks’ coach Jeff Van Gundy, his track record certainly warranted at least an interview.
Perhaps we didn’t pay enough attention to Jackson’s cryptic tweets from February.
I am sad about D-Fish. However, I'm not discouraged. Here is some things pundits should know before assuming 'next'. pic.twitter.com/cFnA8TQAhx
— Phil Jackson (@PhilJackson11) February 9, 2016
For better or worse, his disdain for the Riley/Van Gundy coaching tree is well known. It’s quite possible Jackson viewed Thibodeau’s hard-nosed style as a series of transactions rather than the intellectual transformation the Zen Master prefers.
After Thibs got the message, or lack thereof, he moved on to the most attractive job available. Shortly after, Scott Brooks took his coaching acumen, and remote influence over Durant’s free agency, to Washington. Two viable candidates off the board, while the Knicks had only talked with one external option – David Blatt.
The only information coming from Jackson, or the front office, were social media entries of Thai cuisine and equestrian tombstones. The posts only served to ignite unsubstantiated speculation indicative of the most impatient city in the world.
"Curly"moment. pic.twitter.com/xKgKl5SYt4
— Phil Jackson (@PhilJackson11) May 5, 2016
After Frank Vogel was unexpectedly fired, the Knicks reportedly met with him. Vogel was a young coach with a proven track record. But his profile seemed to mirror that of Thibodeau. A tough, defensive guru with an unimaginative offense.
Then a seemingly unexpected interview was conducted with former Suns coach Jeff Hornacek. The only candidate with no direct connection to either Phil Jackson or Steve Mills. He was dismissed as a legitimate candidate by the New York media.
Two days later, Howard Beck stunned the basketball community when he reported the Knicks had decided upon that very candidate.
Breaking: Knicks will hire Jeff Hornacek as head coach, per NBA source.
— Howard Beck (@HowardBeck) May 18, 2016
The news may have been shocking to many, but Beck was on the trail all along. He narrowly called this back on February 8th, the same day Derek Fisher was fired, and just a week after Hornacek got canned by the Suns.
Beyond the obvious candidates with PhilJax ties, I'm also told to keep an eye on Jeff Hornacek. Has rapport/respect w/Jax.
— Howard Beck (@HowardBeck) February 8, 2016
This is the second major decision in consecutive offseasons – last year it was drafting Porzingis – that proves the New York media is on the outside trying to peer into Phil Jackson’s tight knit inner circle. A refreshing change of course for a franchise that has been as transparent as Larry Bird’s skin tone (according to Bill Murray).
But back to the decision itself.
How did a coach with no triangle experience and no immediate ties with Jackson, or Mills, come out on top?
While Hornacek never had an intimate relationship with Jackson, he always had his respect.
Despite not communicating directly, the two became acquainted with each other when the Bulls defeated the Jazz in the 1997 and 1998 NBA Finals. However, it appears that Hornacek had the gleam of Phil’s eye even before that. There are rumors that Jackson had tried to acquire Hornacek before he ultimately ended up in Utah at the deadline in 1994.
After all, Hornacek was a perfect fit for the triangle. A second round pick out of Iowa State, Hornacek carved out a role for himself as one of the elite jump shooters in the NBA. But he was more than that. Hornacek proved capable at handling all aspects of the game, a true combo guard. Over the course of his career, he averaged 4.9 assists and 3.4 rebounds per game, to go with his scoring output of 14.5 points. The philosophy of the triangle is to replace the role of a single point guard with multiple guards capable of passing, screening and scoring. The multi-faceted Hornacek fit the bill perfectly.
Perhaps most importantly, he had already been exposed to the triangle. That’s right, Hornacek was coached in Phoenix by one of the early adopters of the triangle, Cotton Fitzsimmons. Fitzsimmons was an assistant coach at Kansas State in 1967 to the godfather of the system, Tex Winter. Cotton took over as head coach at Kansas State the very next year, continuing to run the triangle.
He only stayed two years before making his jump to the NBA. Fitzsimmons carried Winter’s triangle offense to the Phoenix Suns during his first stint. In just the the third and fourth seasons in Suns franchise history, Fitzsimmons led them to 48 wins in 1970 and 49 wins in 1971.
It would be years later before Fitzsimmons eventually returned to where his NBA coaching career began. In 1988, he was hired to take over a Suns team coming off four consecutive losing seasons. After picking up Tom Chambers in free agency, and trading Larry Nance in a deal for Kevin Johnson and 1988 draftee Dan Majerle, the Suns would feature a different look. Fitzsimmons adapted appropriately, cultivating an uptempo offense to accentuate the talents of his players.
Over the next four years, the Suns would finish in the top-4 in points per game every year, and top-4 in pace for all but one (in which they finished 7th). Fitzsimmons showed the ability to build strategy around his team, and it paid off big time. The Suns compiled a total record of 217 wins and 111 losses, including two trips to the Western Conference Finals, behind their high powered offense. Hornacek especially benefited, posting career highs in points (20.1), rebounds (5.0) and steals (2.0) in the 1991-92 season – the lone All-Star appearance of his career.
The Suns sold high on Hornacek, shipping him in a deal to Philadelphia for Charles Barkley. He played point guard for the 76ers in 1992-93, amassing a career high 6.9 assists per game. A short layover before ultimately getting dealt to Utah at the 1994 trade deadline.
It was in Utah that Hornacek experienced the most team success of his playing career. The Jazz were built around two of the NBA’s greatest 50 players of all-time in John Stockton and Karl Malone. Hornacek would play the key, but oft forgotten, role as the secondary scorer behind Karl Malone. Again Hornacek found himself under the tutelage of a great coach, but in a completely different system.
In contrast to the uptempo system run by Cotton Fitzsimmons in Phoenix, Jerry Sloan ran his team at a much slower pace but with great efficiency. From 1994-1998, Sloan’s Jazz were in the bottom half of the league in pace, but a top-2 team in offensive rating. He ran a system that was a variation of the Flex and UCLA offenses, which featured a lot of movement, with guard screens and cuts – much like the triangle. It was the same system Sloan ran throughout his 23-year tenure as the Jazz coach.
The Jazz came the closest of any team to beating the Bulls during Jordan’s reign, but ultimately fell short in back-to-back years. Hornacek played out the rest of his career in Utah before retiring a Jazz in 2000. After his playing career, Hornacek took time away from the game in order to raise his family.
Seven years later, his services would be called upon again by Jerry Sloan. Andrei Kirilenko was having issues with his jump shot. Coming off a season in which he shot just 21.3% from three, Hornacek worked with Kirilenko to restore confidence in his jumper. The next season Kirilenko shot a career high 37.9% from beyond the arc.
Hornacek continued as a part-time shooting coach for the next four years, while his kids were still growing up. He worked with several players on the Jazz, but his greatest accomplishment was with a player who didn’t even consider himself a shooter.
Wes Matthews was an undrafted free agent out of Marquette University. When the Jazz signed him, Sloan immediately took a liking to his competitive nature and gritty defense. But his lack of shooting forced Sloan to pull him from the end of games, when other teams could sag off him in crunch time.
Hornacek made it his goal to work personally with Matthews to improve his shooting, as detailed by Joe Freeman of the Oregonian:
The pair became inseparable and worked to refine Matthews’ stroke through repetition and diligence. Every day, sometimes twice a day, they would work. Off days. Game days. Practice days. Holidays. It didn’t matter. Matthews said a day didn’t go by without the two working on shooting drills.
Matthews would shoot spot-up threes and spot-up jumpers from a variety of areas on the court, as part of a normal shooting routine that virtually every guard in the NBA does. But Hornacek pushed Matthews beyond the standard operating procedure. He didn’t just instruct Matthews, he competed with him.
The most demanding work was on practice days. The two would meet 90 minutes before scheduled workouts and heave countless shots. They’d set up a machine that rebounded and fired passes back to the perimeter, and they made it part of their game, moving from one spot to the next on the court, over and over and over, in constant motion, with the machine firing passes again and again.
“He would have us moving nonstop,” Matthews said. “I would run behind him and shoot, the gun would move, and then he would run behind me and shoot and the gun would move. There was constant movement and then a shot. Movement and then a shot.”
Matthews is fueled by competition — doesn’t matter if it’s a game of Monopoly or basketball, he wants to win — and the rounds with Hornacek proved to be a test of endurance and patience. Hornacek once set an NBA record by making eight consecutive threes in a game without a miss, and he never lost his shooting stroke. Matthews found it nearly impossible to defeat his mentor.
“I beat him twice,” he said, chuckling. “We did it the whole year, every day, and I only beat him twice.”
At Marquette, Matthews was a career 34.1% 3-point shooter. His improvement in the NBA stemmed from the time spent refining his shot in Utah.
“I owe everything to Jeff Hornacek,” Matthews said.
Now a career 38.7% 3-point shooter, Matthews is seen as one of the better 3-and-D players in the NBA. This past offseason he was rewarded with a maximum contract from the Dallas Mavericks.
With a proven track record for player development, Hornacek had shown his ability to coach. The team he began his professional career with took notice. On May 28, 2013 the Phoenix Suns hired Hornacek as their head coach.
Hornacek took charge of a Suns roster that was talented, but misshapen. The two best players, Goran Dragic and Eric Bledsoe, occupied similar roles as lead guards. Much like Cotton Fitzsimmons had done in Phoenix years earlier, Hornacek created a strategy to promote the strengths of his players. Equipped with two talented guards, he implemented an uptempo offense utilizing their speed and creativity.
In his first year, the Suns shocked the league by achieving a 48-34 record, missing the playoffs by just one game in what was meant to be a rebuilding year. The Suns scored the most fast break points per game, shot the 4th most threes and were 8th in pace and offensive rating. Hornacek let his players do what they do best – get out in transition and make plays. In the process he was able to extract career years out of Goran Dragic, Gerald Green and Eric Bledsoe. Many around the league believed Dragic was the best point guard in the NBA that year. By building the offense around the skill sets of his players, many having the most efficient years of their career.
What started off as a fairy tale quickly turned into a nightmare. It started in the 2014 offseason with an innocent value grab of Isaiah Thomas. The diminutive guard proved to be a reliable scorer in Sacramento, but was undervalued by the Kings. The Suns’ front office responded aptly by signing and trading for Thomas on a 4-year, $27 million deal. Great from a value perspective, the move challenged the roster construction.
Already stacked in the backcourt, Hornacek had to figure out how to accommodate three ball dominant players. For the most part, he succeeded. The Suns had a winning record of 29-25 at the trade deadline. To maximize their talent, Hornacek often deployed three guard sets to get his best players on the floor. But the dramatic change in player roles was taking its toll – especially on Goran Dragic. There simply wasn’t enough ball to go around between Dragic, Bledsoe and Thomas. As the deadline approached, there were reports that Dragic wanted to run the team or be traded somewhere he could. According to Ken Berger of CBS, Hornacek subsequently convinced Dragic to resign with Phoenix that summer.
Within days of Hornacek having a heart-to-heart with Dragic and securing a commitment from the Slovenian point guard to re-sign with the Suns as a free agent the following summer, the Suns shipped him to Miami in a three-team trade, a person familiar with the situation told CBS Sports.
But for the front office, it was too little, too late. The Suns likely could have convinced Dragic to stay by trading away Thomas, and handing him back the keys. Alternatively, they might have sided with the value of Thomas and split ties with Dragic. Trading either one would remedy the situation. Instead, they did the unthinkable and moved both at the trade deadline. The Suns shipped out both Dragic and Thomas AND dealt one of their key assets (the Lakers’ top 3 protected 1st rounder) for a lesser guard in Brandon Knight.
It was a catastrophic shift for the Suns, and the impact was immediate. Knight would be plagued by injury, playing in only 11 of the remaining 28 games. The Suns sputtered down the stretch, finishing 10-18 and fading from playoff contention. The ensuing offseason did them no favors.
Enthralled with the pursuit of LaMarcus Aldridge, the Suns went all-in on Plan A. Ignoring the fact that their roster wasn’t built for contention, Suns’ General Manager Ryan McDonough signed Tyson Chandler to a 4-year, $52 million contract. In order to create the space to sign Tyson – while leaving enough to offer Aldridge a max contract – McDonough traded Marcus Morris to the Detroit Pistons for a 2nd round pick. The move came just a year after signing the Morris twins to 4-year deals – Marcus at $20 million and Markieff for $32 million – while pledging unity.
The pair felt both financially and philosophically betrayed by the Suns’ front office.
“Everybody thinking that we’re upset because we don’t get to play with each other,” says Marcus, legs stretched in front of him after a Pistons practice in late January. “Kieff can’t deal with adversity? We’re from north Philadelphia. This isn’t adversity. This is betrayal.”
“What bothers me most are two things,” says Marcus. “I sat down with the owner and we agreed guys were going to get paid more, but they told us, ‘Don’t get upset, we’re a family, we’re helping each other.’ Everybody in this league is concerned about money. We were looking for stability and the chance to be part of something.”
The breach of trust sent Markieff into an uncorrectable tailspin.
Hornacek was doomed before the 2015-16 season even began. One of his best players was irreconcilable, and the roster incongruent. The addition of Tyson Chandler was an impedance of youngster Alex Len, and uptempo play. Brandon Knight couldn’t match the caliber of Dragic. And when Eric Bledsoe was lost for the season in December, the season was lost. The roster meddling and lofty gambles by the front office had left Hornacek with a team devoid of the identity and talent necessary to win. Yet it was Hornacek who would ultimately take the fall.
A year and a half removed from being runner-up in Coach of the Year voting – Gregg Popovich captured the crown – Jeff Hornacek found himself on the coaching carousel.
When Hornacek was hired by the Knicks, questions arose because he wasn’t part of the infamous Phil Jackson coaching tree. The narrative being constructed – the hiring was so obtuse, it must be a conspiratorial exit plan for Phil.
But all of the pieces to the puzzle fit, if one takes the time to look.
During his playing career, Hornacek had the privilege of playing for two of the greatest coaches of all-time in Cotton Fitzsimmons and Jerry Sloan. Both coaches have the utmost respect from Phil Jackson.
Fitzsimmons was one of the first adopters of the triangle, if not the second. Yet, even he saw it wise to adapt his system to the players on his roster. A valuable lesson that Hornacek himself would implement when he coached the Suns years later.
His time under Sloan was also invaluable. It taught him that winning formulas can vary based upon the ingredients on hand. Hornacek came from one of the fastest paced teams in Phoenix, to one of the slowest in Utah. Both equally effective, but vastly different. His ability to play effectively in both systems, and learn different play-styles is indicative of his nature.
Hornacek may not exclusively run the Triangle, but he will use parts of it, as well as parts from all of the systems he’s been exposed to over the years.
The most important change in philosophy he brings, an increase in fast-break scoring and three-point shooting. The two just happen to be among the most statistically efficient methods of point generation available. Naturally, the Knicks have been putrid at both. They ranked dead last in fast-break points the past four seasons, and 23rd in three-pointers attempted last year.
Another welcome change will be Hornacek’s willingness to utilize analytics. In this Q&A with Zach Lowe in 2013, Hornacek revealed two key tactics philosophically derived from statistics. The limitation of the long two-point shot and increase in volume of shots early in the shot clock.
ZL: Wait, now. “Seven seconds” is a buzzword in Phoenix.
JH: Yeah, yeah, let’s stick with eight. Statistics say in the first eight seconds, you shoot a much higher percentage. A lot of it depends on what kind of players you have. I knew they had [Goran] Dragic, who can fly up and down the court. And obviously now, with Eric Bledsoe, those two guys jell perfectly.
ZL: You guys were either no. 1 or no. 2 in midrange jumpers, and fell way below the league’s average in 3-point attempts. Do you want to change that?
JH: Oh, yeah. We gotta get rid of that long 2. I’m not opposed to the middle jumper, in that 15- or 16-foot range. I think all but two teams that were in the playoffs, their effective field goal percentages were above 51 percent. If you can shoot 15-footers and shoot 52 percent, OK, you’re beating the average. You can’t totally discount those shots.
The Knicks attempted the 2nd most two-point field goals greater that 19-feet from the basket, shooting 38% on those attempts. They also took the 22nd most shots within the first 8 seconds of the shot clock, registering the 3rd worst effective field goal percentage on those at 52%. Both numbers figure to change under Hornacek.
In many ways, Hornacek serves as a bridge between the old guard and the new. He believes in the basics, system basketball and defense, yet, is willing to incorporate analytics. It’s this congruity between old-school fundamentals and new-school analytics that make Hornacek the perfect hire for Phil Jackson’s Knicks.
Above all else, there is a mutual respect between Hornacek and Jackson. There will be a two-way street of information flowing between the pair, a level of communication that didn’t exist with Derek Fisher at the helm.
A picture is worth a thousand words, or one simpatico.